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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

vs.

OaseNo.

WILLIAM ARNOLD LANGLEY and
JAMES KANATH HOLMAN,

11911

Defendants-Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an ap1peal from a jury verdict of guillty to the
crime of robbery.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The jury found the defendants guilty of robbery. They
were sentenced to Utah State Prison for an indelterminate
term as provided by laJw.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent i;:ubmits that the judgment of the lower
comit should be affirmed.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Love owns and operates as sole proprietor Love's
Diamonds at 161 South Main in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Shortly before 5 :00 p. m. on April 22, 1968, Mr. Holman
entered Love's Diamonds and indicated to Mr. Love that
he was just looking at the merchandise. Mr. Love waited ,
on 1a customer named Mr. Boone and observed Mr. Holman
as 'he continued his work (T. 635-636). After Mr. Boone
left, Mr. Hoilman asked to see a watch band and when Mr.
Love reached down to pick one out, Mr. Holman pulled a
gun and instructed Mr. Love to get down behind a counter.
Mr. Love followed his instructions, and Mr. Holman taped
his eyes •shut (T. 616).
Mr. Love then heard someone else come into the store,
and he could hear jewelry being put into a paper s·ack. At
this time a regular customer, Mrs. Furlong, entered the
jewelry shop and asked to buy an inexpensive chain. Mr.
Langley waited on Mrs. Furlong while Mr. Hoilman 1was
on ltop of Mr. Love behind the counter (T. 622). Mr.
Langley told Mrs. Furlong to try Zales Jewelry Store, and
Mrs. Furlong left the store (T. 675-684).
After Mm. Furlong leflt the store, the men looked for
oash and taped Mr. Love's feet. Mrs. Taylor :then arrived
at the store and observed a man with his back toward her. ,
He turned and walked past Mrs. Taylor out of store. Mr.
Love then raised up fram behind the counter 1and said :that
he had been robbed ( T. 884-886) . Mrs. Tayilor :trued to
folfow the man she had seen, but to no ava:iL Later, Mrs.

Taylor gave a descniption of the man to the pO'lice officers
(T. 917).
Mr. Horne was parked in front of Love's Jewelry
Store and observed Mr. Holman coming out of Love's
Jewelry Store with a brown paper sack in his hand 1a minute or so after he had seen Mr. Langley come out of the
Store (T. 1013-1014). He also siaw Mrs. Taylor walk in
the jewelry store as Mr. Hoiman walked out (T. 1016).
Shortly thereaf1ter the poliice arrived and interviewed all
witnesses.
1

Later, Mr. Love identified Mr. Holman as the man
who held the gun on him in his store (T. 625-641), Mrs.
Furlong identified Mr. Langley as the man who waited on
her in the jewelry store (T. 681-684), Mr. Horne identified
Mr. Holman as the man who walked out of Love'i:s Jewelry
Store with a brown paper sack in his hand, and Mr. Langley
as the man who walked out a few minutes before Mr. Holman (T. 1013-1016). Mrs. Taylor first suggested to the
police thait she :would be able to 1identify the person that
she saw and gave a description to the
At the time
of the trial she was not sure whether she had ever seen
the appe'llanbs before. Mr. Love's and Mrs. Furlong's identificatiorns were from pholtographs and Mr. Horne's identificaltiion wa:s from the lineup.
The appellants were apprehended on the basis of the
photographic identifications of Mr. Love and Mr. Furlong.
Further identifioaltion was obtained through a 11ineup attended by Mrs. Furlong, Mr. Horne, and Mr. O'Connell! of
the Leg,a:l Defenders Office, counsel for the appellants at
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that time. During the lineup, Mrs. Furlong identified Mr.
Langley, and Mr. Horne :identified Mr. Holman.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IDENTIFYING THE APPELLANTS WAS NOT TAINTED IN ANY MANNER, AND THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS NOT A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
The aippeHants rely upon United States v. Wade, 388
U. S. 218 (1967) for the proposition that rthe absence of
counsel ait their lineup was constitutional enor which
tainted the identifications of the appeHants and rendered
fill'em inadmissii.ble in court. A dose reading of the record
.in :the instant case indicaJtes that rthe Wade case 1is not appli.cable ito the appellants' circumstances. In the Wade case,
counsel was appointed fifteen days before the Ji:ineup wais
held and was not given notice of the lineup. Such error
tainted the identifications at the lineup and rendered them
rinadmissihle in court.
In the insrbant case, the appellants had not acquired
counsel prior to the lineup so counsel from the Legal Defender's Office was assigned to the appellants. Mr. O'Connel1 testified that he was assigned to the appel1anlts and
was present at the lineup on their be.half (T. 482-490).
The presence of counsel at the lrineup protected the ridentificaJtions from being tainted due to absence orf counsel, and
there was no finding by the :trial courrt rbhat a constitutional
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denial of the right to counsel at the lineup occurred (T.
491-493). There is no basis from which a faint could arise
because counsel for the appellants was present at the lineup
and agreed as to itts composition (T. 487-488).
There were adequaite identificaitions made prior to the
lineup from an independent source which could not be suppressed in court even if the lineup were illegal. Mrs. FurIong identified Mr. Langley after being shown 50 to 75
photos on three different occasions (T. 681-684). Mr.
Love identified Mr. Holman a:£ter 'looking at 180-220 photos
on f:ive drifferent occasions (T. 625-641). In addition, Mr.
Langley introduced evidence from the lineup itself which
opened rthe door for the prosecution to also use the lineup
identificaiJions (T. 699-734; 838). Consequently, Mr.
Horne's lineup identification of Mr. Hdlman, and Mrs. Furlong's lineup idenJtlification of Mr. Langley are admissible
in court wirthout being tainted in any manner.
1

The appelfants argue that the police staJtion confron:tation in Olovis, New Mexico, between Mr. Love and Mr.
Holman was so suggestive thaJt it violated due process. The
respondent points out that Mr. Love had ooequqate rune
to observe the appellant at the time of the robbery and
that before Mr. Love saw Mr. Holman in New Mex:ico, he
had identified Mr. Holman afrter beling shown 180-220 pholbographs on five different occasions (T. 61.25-6141). Mr.
Love also gave a deta:iled description of Mr. Holman to
the police afrter the robbery. In viiew of :these factors, the respondent submits thaJt there was adequate inde-

pendent identification of the appellant by the respondent
regardless of the police station confrontation in New Mexico.
In State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P. 2d 786
(1969), the court held that in spite of a lineup without
counsel, the 'identification of a defendant robber was from
an indpendent source where the facts indicated that the
viotim gave a description of the assailants !themselves
shortly thereafter. In the instant case, Mr. Love was capable of making an adequate fodependent identification
based upon his observation of the appellant at the time of
the robbery, his description of the appellants given to the
police, and the photographic identification. The appellant
was not unduly prejudiced by the proceedings in New Mexico because there was adequate independent identification
the confrontation in New Mexico notwithstanding.
1

The appellants also argue that the method of showing
rthe pictures was suggestive and was so conducted to influence any identifiicartion to be made. Upon this issue there
were conflicibing statements made by the witnesses as to
whether such methods were actually used (T. 628, 418).
Mrs. Taylor testified that she felt pressure to identify someone when she was shown the plictures, and she claimed that
one picture kept coming back for her consideration. Mr.
Love and Mrs. Furlong tes tif1ied that pressure or suggestive
method•,:; were not used during their photographic ,identification (T. 628, 139, 140). These testimonies raise a factual
issue for the jury as to the credibility of the testimonies,
and there was no jury finding that suggestive methods were
used. In view of a:ll the identifications made, the testimony
1
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of Mrs. Taylor does not prejudice the 1identification procesis.
to identify
The State did not use Mrs. Tay,lor's
the appellants (T. 418, 419), the witnesses who did identify
the appellants had adequaJte time to observe the appellants
at the >time of the robbery, the witnesses were shown a great
number of pictures before they identified the appellants
and the only source of information concerning isuggestive
methods was Mrs. Taylor's testimony.
The appellants imply thait the conflicting te.stimony
raises a reasonable doUJbt as to the identification itself and
so renders the identification unreliable. In an appeal from
a conviction of armed robbery, People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.
2d 175, 217 P. 2d 1 (1950), Justice Traynor de.scribed the
role of the jury concerning conflicting testimony and identification.
"It is for the trier of facts to weigh the evidence relaJting to iderrtif ication and to resolve the
confliots therein. His accep.tance of an identification not inherently impr<ibruble must be upheld if
there is substantial evidence to support it, even
though contrary evidence, if believed, would have
induced a conltrary result."
The respondent submirts that the jury verdict in this
case was baised upon substantial evidence which adequately
resolved the conflicting testimony and did not violate any
principles within our judicial process.

POINT II.
A JURY C 0 N S I S T I NG OF LESS THAN
TWELVE MEMBERS IS NOT A DENIAL OF

8
DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW'S.
In a recenit Supreme Com:1t case, Williams v. Florida,
------ U. S. ------, 38 L. W. 4557, the court answered the question as to whether or not the constitutional guarantee of
a !trial by jury required a triail by exactly twelve persons,
rruther than a lesi;:;er number, to reach a conviction for robbery. The Court specifically held that a twerJve-man jury
was not a "necessary ingredient of a tria;l by jury" and
that 11:lhe six-member jury provided for lby Florida :Jaw was
not a violation of the petitioner's Sixth Amendmenit l'ights.
In vliew of this decision, the respondent submiits that
the eight-man jury in Uta:h is not a violation of lthe appellants' right to a jury trial.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR TO THE
PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANTS IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY A:S TO HIS
THEORY OF THE CASE.
The standard for determining rfille
i:in:structions to be given irs whelther the instructions adequate1y
relate to the evi:denoe presented. In the case of People V.
Cummings, 14!1 C. A. 193, 296 P. 2d 610 (19 56), which included an attempt to commiit an abortion, the California
1

court expressed rthe followiing view :
"Whfle irt is wen settled that a defendanlt is en·
,tJiitled to instructions based on fue theory of his de-
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fense, the court may refuse proffered instructions
on a theory that is not supported by substantial
evidence."
The "substantial evidence" test is used by rthe Utah
courts also. In the oase of State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130,
185 P. 2d 738 (1947), which involved the defense of selfdefenBe in a conviciJion for involuntary mailSllaughter, the
court said:
"It is admitted that the defendant is entitled

to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case
if there is any substantial evidence to justify giving
such an instruction. However, when tile Legislature permits a defendant to avoid the consequences
of his act because the kiHing was excusable, an instruction is not necessary unless the facts and circumstances impellring the accused to act are in some
way consistent with the legislative intent to excuse."
(Emphasis added.)
1

The respondent submits that there 1was no "swbstantial
evidence" in this case olther than the testimony of the appellant himself upon which the oomit cowld form its instructions. There was no evidence from Mr. Love or the
party in Phoenix, Arizona that such an arrangement for
the robbery was made. The court need noit rely upon the
uncorroboralted testimony of ithe appellant, and thrut testimony, in view of all the f act8, does not constitute "substantial evidence" upon which the court could form an instruction.
POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE CONSTITUTING PERJURY
OR KNOWING USE OF FALSE TESTIMONY

10
CONCERNS ONLY THE CREDIBILITY OF
THE WITNESSES AND NOT PERJURY.
The appellants assume that if the credibility of a wirtness' testimony is questioned, it also means that the Witness
has perjured himself or has at least knowingly given false
testimony. This may not necessarily be the case because
the credibility of a witness can be pointed out in matters
where perjury is totaHy 'irrelevant, to-wit: bias, rinterest,
prior conviotions, prior bad acts, prfor inconsistent statements, veracity, etc.
The appelilants' argument to supporlt the a:llegaibion of
perjury i:s that ·the testrimony of the State's witnesses varied
remarkably betbween the preliminary hearing and trial.
This may be true, but such facts do not constitute the commission of perjury. Such inconsistent statements reflect
the credibility of the testimony given.
"Every witness whooe testimony is shown in
conflict wi:th a previous 1statement made by him, is
not necessarily revealed thereby as a dishonest person; the impeachment, in many instances, may uncover only a fau'1ty memory in the discredited witness. The I'equirement that the idenrtifying circumstances of time, place, those present, and the staitement that the witness ithen made shall be related to
him, 'is founded upon the experience whkh frequently presents itself in lthe courtroom, that a witness, who has stoutly denied haviing made an alleged statement may finwHy blushingly and apologetically admit it, when the questJioner throws
association with it identifying circumstances. It
a common oibservaition that associated ideas, as they
are related, one after another, not infrequently sue-
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ceed in upturning a fact which previously had defied all efforts of recollection." Coles v. Harsch,
129 Or. 11, 16, 276 P. 248 (1929).
Prior inconsistent statements may effectively destroy
the credibility of the witness in the eyes of the jury, but
it does not establish that there was perjury or false testimony.
The appeiHant must show that the perjury or false
statemen1t was made with an intent to deceive and was
made knowingly and de'liberately because incoru;istent statements are not sufficient to support a conviction of perjury.
People v. Glenn, 294 Ill. 333, 128 N. E. 532, 534 (1920).
This requii,ement ,is fmither explained in People v. McClintic, 193 Mich. 589, 160 N. W. 461, 464 (1916).
"We 1tJhlnk that it should be held that a conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon
the contradictory sworn ,s,tatement of the defendant,
but the prosecution must also prove which of the
two s\ta;tements is false, and must show that statement to be fa lse by other evidence than the contradictory statement."
1

The record does not indicate that Mr. Langley had information other than inconsistent statements to support a
conviction of perjury (T. 701-702).

POINT V.
APPELLANTS WERE NOT DENIED DUE
PROCESS BECAUSE MR. LANGLEY PROCEEDED TO DEFEND HIMSELF OR BECAUSE THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT AFFORDED SEPARATE TRIALS.
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The appellants argue that they were denied the effective wi.d and assisitance of counsel due Ito the faclt that
Mr. Langley was proceeding in Propria Persona and
was not competent to reipresent himself. 'The transcript
indiioarbes
Mr. Langley knowingly waived his right to
counsel and ohose rto proceed ais his own counsel in spite
of the court's aidvise and encouragemenrt to do otherwise
(T. 308, 301, 363, 594).
After such refusa:ls to accept cournse'1, the appellant
should not now be al'lowed to argue that 'h:is ltr'ial was prejudlicial because appeUant Langley chose, in spite of the advice
and counsel of the Court, to proceed on his own, and then
committed errors in trial procedure. Mr. Langley's waiver
was made with full knowledge of the consequence of proceeding In Propria Persona and precludes h!im from asserting that proceeding in his own defense was a denial of due
process. Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 150 (1966);
Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
'Dhe appellants argue thrut they were sulbstantia'lly
prejudiced because their molbions for severance were de·
:nlied. As authority for this proposition, United States v.
Branker, 39'5 F. 2rd 881 (1968) is cited. A reading of this
case indicaJtes th:aJt the factual circumstances orf the Branker
cas•e are not applicruble to :the appeHants' situation. In the
Branker caise, there were twelve defendants and six co-con·
spliraJtors named 1in eighty-four counts. The comit r.ecog·
n1iwd ithat !because the counts were so numerous, the record
wau ld be very complex and
for the jurors to keeP
the various charges against the several defendants separate
1

in the,ir minds. The court granted severance to several defendants because they would have been prejudiced by the
quantity of proof brought forward to convict other defendants whfrle their 1litigiaJtion involved only a small matter.
Also, there was very little connection criminally between
those defendants who were severed 1and the other defendants.
In the trhd of the appellants there was no danger of
a ma&S tria:l containing numerous counts and factual data.
'flhe only charge against the appellants was that of robbery
on the itwenty-second day of April, 1968 (R. 23-Informailion) . The two appellants we11e present to answer th!is
charge af1ter w:itnesses had identified ithe appellantbs from
photogmphs. There were no complicated factual issues or
defenses presented by the defendants rtJo the court which
would confuse the jury in their determinaJtion. Neither
was there a difference in the quantiity of eviidence required
to convicJt either of the appellants. The identifiootion by
the witnesses of the appellanits raises a question orf fact
as 1to whether or not the appellants were at the scene of
the r<Ybbery, and truis connection does not appear to be
prejudieial to the appellants being joined 'in this litigation.
It does not appear that there was any denial of due process
or ithat the constitutional rights of the appellants were infringed upon by the joint trial of the defendants.
POINT VI.
THE DELAY IN PROVIDING THE APPELLANTS WITH A TRANSCRIPT DID NOT
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PREJUDICE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE APPELLANTS.
The record shows tha;t on September 10, 1969, the
desired manuscripts (preliminary hearings) were delivered
by Mr. Walter R. Ellett to the Sheriff of Salt Lake County
for delivery to Mr. Holman (R. 209). The transcript also
conltains an explanation for any delay in the delivery of
the transcript (T. 361).

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) required the .
avaiilabiliity of the transcript on an appeal from a trial
court decision to an appellate court. That decision does
not concern the availability of preliminary hearing tran·
scripts for trial court decisions. The absence of the preliminary hearing transcripts at a trial court proceeding is '
not constitutional error or a den'ial of due process.
The appel'lants did have the transcripts for appeal
from the trial court decision which renders this i>.ssue moot.
The preliminary hearing did not preclude the appel·
lants from raising any issue at trial, and a transcript of
that hearing was not e&Sential to the appellants' defense
wt trial. There is no requirement that guilty or not guilty
pleas be made at a preliminary hearing so this was not a
critical s:tage of the proceeding. United States v. Wade,'
388 U. S. 218 (1967); Ash v. Turner, ______ F. 2d ______ (10th

1

Cir., April 6, 1970). The absence of the preliminary hear·
ing transcript at the trial did nat prejudice the appellants
in any manner.
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POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY NOT
PROVIDING INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE
LESSER OFFENSE OF GRAND LARCENY.
The appellants argue that the trial court failed to
properly instruct the jury because there were no instructions concerning the lesser offense of grand larceny. Consequently, the appellants argue that they were denied their
rights and were unduly prejudiced under Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-33-6 (1953).
"The jury may find the defendant guilty of any
offense the commission of which is necessarily included in that which he is charged in the indictment
or information, or of an attempt to commit the
offense."
In State v. Sullivan, 73 Utah 582, 276 Pac. 166 (1929),
the defendant was convicted of robbery and excepted to
the instructions because the lesser offenses of grand larceny and petty larceny were not given to the jury. On
appeal, his argument was that it was the duty of the trial
court to instruct the jury tha;t these crimes were included
within the charge. The Court, however, felt that the defendant •should have first requested that the lesser crimes
were to be included in the jury instructions. The weight
of authority, cited by the Utah Court, is that "before a
defendant can be heard to complain because the trial court
did not instruct upon the law of lesser offenses included
within the crime charged, such defendant must have requested instruction upon the included offense or offenses."
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This Court held in the Sullivan case that the failure to
give such instructions was not rever.sible error and af.
firmed the conviction. People v. Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21
Pac. 403 ( 1889) .
The appellants do not allege that they requested the
instrueitions concerning the lesser offenses nor can this
request be found in the record. Without a request for in·
structions concerning the lesser offenses, it is clear that
a court does not prejudicially err in nOlt giving such instructions. There was no prejudicial error committed in.
the giving of instruction 18 which does not contain instruc·
tions as to the lesser offenses to the jury.

POINT VIII.
THE ORAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE
APPELLANTS' FORMER CRIMIN AL ACTIVITIES WAS HEARD IN THE ABSENCE OF
THE JURY AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
The appellanits do not cite the transcript to indicaite I
where such evidence was admitted. After reading the tran·
script, the respondent found testimony given in court to
the effect that the appellants were "in and out of jail all
across the country" (T. 937). On page 924 of the tran·
script, the court specifically calls the attention of the rec- 1
ord to the fact that the jury had left the room, and they
were absent for the testimony of Mrs. Taylor concerning
the pri.or criminal activities of the appellants.
The respondent submits that the jury was not preju·
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diced by the testimony concerning the prior criminai activities because the jury was absent and did not hear the
tesitimony.

CONCLUSION
The record reveals that the appellants' constbitutional
righits were in no way violated, and they received a fair
trial free of significant error. The evidence offered by fue
Strute was free from any taint :thaJt may have unfairly prejudiced the jury. From the authortty cii.ted, it is clear that
the points raised in the appellants' bl"ief are without merit,
and the respondent respectfully asks tJhis court to affirm
the convictions of ithe court below.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney Gene:ml

Attorneys for Respondents

